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Carrots, Sticks and Broken Windows
I.  Introduction
In the decade ending in 1999, there were significant drops in serious crime
throughout the United States.  From 1990 to 1999, violent crime rates fell by about 28%
and property crime rates fell by about 26% nationally.
1 Many metropolitan areas fared
even better than national trends in crime reduction.  The drop in violent crime rates in
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami and San Diego ranged from 33 percent to
53 percent.
2  Although it followed the general trends, New York City experienced even
more dramatic declines in crime: violent crimes declined by over 56% and property
crimes fell by about 65% in the 1990s.  Many attribute New York's crime reduction to
specific policies carried out by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's administration, with its "get-
tough" approach to crime fighting.  The most prominent of the policy changes was the
aggressive policing of lower-level crimes, a policy which has been called "broken
windows" approach to law enforcement.  Skeptics believe that New York City's
experience was attributable to other factors such as economic boom of the 1990s, enjoyed
both in New York City and nationally.  For example, the national unemployment rate
declined by 25% between 1990 and 1999, and it declined by 39% between 1992 and 1999
in New York City. 
3
                                                          
1 Source: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
2000.
2  Source: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
2000 and 1991.
3 Another explanation which is offered as a factor that has contributed to the drop in crime is reduction in
the cohort size due to decline in fertility because of  the legalization of abortion in the U.S. following the
1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe versus Wade. (Donahue and Levitt 2001).   If most of the averted
pregnancies are to women with economically disadvantaged backgrounds, then the legalization of abortion
reduces the number of crime-prone children, and this would have an impact on crime 16-20 years after the
legalization.  We do not directly address the impact of legalized abortion on crime in New York City.
However, in footnote 31 we discuss the potential relevance of this issue.2
The question of whether economic conditions or deterrence policies are more
effective tools of crime control has become an important political issue in other countries
as well.   For example, France's prime minister, Lionel Jospin, indicated that he was
"naive" to believe that lowering unemployment would solve crime problem in France,
and in both Britain and France, conservative as well as liberal politicians are proposing
"get-tough" policies in addition to economic ones in order to battle their rising crime rates
(Nichols, 2002).
The aim of this paper is twofold.  First, it analyzes the impact of economic
conditions (carrots) and various deterrence measures (sticks) on five different index
crimes in New York City between 1974 and 1999.  The ability to include these variables
jointly in a crime supply equation allows us to determine the relative magnitudes of
economic and deterrence measures in a coherent framework.  The second contribution of
the paper is the investigation of the validity of the “broken windows” hypothesis, which
is summarized in a press conference of New York City mayor Rudolph W. Guiliani on
February 24, 1998, where he stated:
[… We have made the “Broken Windows” theory an integral part of our law enforcement
strategy.  This theory says that the little things matter.  As James Q. Wilson describes it, “If a
factory or office window is broken, passersby observing it will conclude that no one cares or no
one is in charge.  In time, a few will begin throwing rocks to break more windows.  Soon all the
windows will be broken, and now passersby will think that, not only no one is in charge of the
building, no one is in charge of the street on which it faces.  So, more and more citizens will
abandon the street to those they assume prowl it.  Small disorders lead to larger ones, and
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perhaps even to crime.”… There’s a continuum of disorder.  Obviously murder and graffiti are
two vastly different crimes.  But they are part of the same continuum, and a climate that tolerates
one is more likely to tolerate the other.]
In this paper, we use monthly time-series data between 1970 and 1999 from New
York City to investigate the extent to which carrots (the unemployment rate and the real
minimum wage), sticks (arrests, police force and prison population), and the “broken
windows” approach to crime control are responsible for the drop in NYC crime from
early-to-late 1990s.   We use misdemeanor arrests as a measure of the extent of the
“broken windows” approach to policing, and find support for the broken windows
hypothesis in case of robberies and motor vehicle thefts.  Although carrots and sticks
both explain crime fluctuations in New York City, the impact of sticks was found to be
stronger than the impact of carrots during the1990s.
In section II we briefly summarize recent literature on the economics of crime,
and provide a description of the broken windows hypothesis.    Sections III and IV
present the empirical model and the data, respectively.  Section V contains the results
and Section VI is the conclusion.
II.  Literature Review and "Broken Windows"
A.  The Impact of Sanctions and Economic Conditions on Crime.
Recent research has demonstrated a significant impact of sanctions on criminal
activity.  [Mustard (forthcoming), Mocan and Gittings (2002), Corman and Mocan
(2000), Levitt (1998a) , Levitt (1997), Levitt (1996)].
4 Although varied in both choice of
                                                          
4 What these articles have in common is an attempt to address some of the empirical issues which have
made identification of the crime supply function so difficult.  Two articles by Levitt, (1996 and 1997), for
example, use election- or litigation-related variables as instruments to help identify the crime supply4
variables and econometric technique, each of these papers addresses previous empirical
problems (mainly the simultaneity between deterrence and crime), and all find that
variables related to expected punishment are more significantly related to crime than in
the previous studies.   Even though earlier work on joblessness-crime and wages-crime
relationships did not provide conclusive evidence (See Corman et al. 1987, and Freeman
1983 and 1995 for reviews), recent papers demonstrated a stronger impact of labor
market conditions on crime.  [Gould, Mustard and Weinberg (2002), Raphael and
Winter-Ebmer (2001), Freeman and Rodgers (2000), Grogger (1998)].   However,
whether economic conditions or deterrence measures have a larger impact on crime is an
unresolved issue.  Data limitations prevented most research from simultaneously
controlling for the impact of labor market variables and deterrence measures.  Micro data
sets may contain information on individuals’ criminal behavior and their wages and
unemployment spells, but they typically lack information on deterrence measures.
5
Researchers who employ aggregate data sets did not always include extensive deterrence
and economic variables.
6  As a result, much of the current inference about the relative
                                                                                                                                                                            
function.  Another article by Levitt (1998a) used cross-crime arrest rates to distinguish between deterrence
and incapacitation effects.  Corman and Mocan (2000) use high-frequency data and modern time-series
techniques to circumvent the simultaneity issue between deterrence and crime.  Mocan and Gittings (2002)
use panel data that contain detailed information on death row inmates to assess the impact of executions
and removals from death row on homicide.   Mustard (forthcoming) includes convictions and length of
imprisonment to investigate the extent of the omitted variable bias.
5 For example, Grogger (1998) investigated the impact of wages on youth crime, but the NLSY data he
used did not include measures of sanctions.   Hashimoto (1987) used arrests as a proxy for crime and
investigated the impact of minimum wages on youth crime with no controls for deterrence.
6 For example, in their investigation of the effect of unemployment on crime Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
(2001) included only state prison population as a control.  Gould, Mustard and Weinberg (2002) focus on
the impact of local labor market conditions on crime.  They add county arrest rates and state-level per
capita police spending and police employment  in county-level crime regressions in one of their
specifications, but exclude them from their analysis in other models they estimate.5
impact of economic conditions and sanctions rely on information obtained from multiple
papers which use different data sets and employ different empirical methods.
7
B.  Broken Windows.
In an often-cited Atlantic Monthly article, Wilson and Kelling (1982) discuss the
importance of maintaining public order.  They argue that, at the community level,
toleration of a high level of disorder results in crime.  They use the image of the broken
window to make the case that visible signs of tolerance of disorder lead to escalating
levels of disorder and crime.  They also posit that aggressive policing strategies,
especially strategies which target high-frequency, low-level crimes, will be effective in
deterring crimes.
It is suggested that a community with a strong level of social order will
experience lower crime levels than low social-order communities for several reasons.
First, these communities possess organizations and relationships which both empower
residents to protect themselves against criminals and also encourage them to identify and
protect others against ill-intentioned intruders.   In this case, criminals will be deterred
because potential victims, crime reporters and witnesses will make the job harder for
potential criminals. Thus, a community with a strong level of social organization will be
harder (more costly) to victimize.  Second, in strong communities with low levels of
"social disorder", criminal behavior on the part of residents is considered socially
unacceptable.  Children, teens, and young adults from these communities will experience
more disutility from committing crimes than others because they will violate community
values more than others.  For these two reasons, strong communities deter crime by
raising the costs to the criminal.  In turn, social order can be enhanced by criminal justice
                                                          
7 See Freeman (1999) for a recent summary.6
policies which send signals that crime will not be tolerated in the community (Kahan,
1998).  Finally, order-maintenance policing can reduce crime in a third way.  By stopping
and questioning individuals who are acting suspiciously, some serious felons may be
apprehended. (Sampson and Cohen, 1988).
Although the literature provides plausible theoretical reasons for why aggressive
policing of minor crimes may deter felonies, the small number of empirical studies do not
shed substantial light on the issue because of their empirical shortcomings.   For example,
in addition to standard identification difficulties, these papers suffer from omitted
variable biases.  This is because they include a measure of police aggressiveness to the
model without controlling for other deterrence measures.
8  Allowing one key variable
(such as police aggressiveness) to increase without holding constant other criminal justice
variables may lead to misleading results.  One possibility would be that the growth in
police aggressiveness may occur because of an overall growth in police resources.  Thus,
the indicator of police aggressiveness may simply be acting as a proxy for felony arrests
or the size of the police force, and the "broken windows" effects would be overstated.
In this paper we measure the extent of the "broken windows" policing by using
misdemeanor arrests as a measure of police signaling, in a model that controls for the
number of police as well as felony arrests.   Increased misdemeanor arrests may reduce
                                                          
8 Sampson and Cohen (1988) investigated the effects of "aggressive" policing on serious crime
rates, where police aggressiveness is measured as the sum of the number of arrests for disorderly conduct
and driving while intoxicated  per police officer.  Using a cross-sectional data of 156 cities, in a model that
did not control for felony arrests, they reported an inverse relationship between police aggressiveness and
the robbery crime rate.  Giacopassi and Forde (2000) test the "broken windows" hypothesis using motor
vehicle fatality rates as a measure of social disorder.  In a cross section of two time periods, they find that
traffic fatalities are significantly related to homicides after controlling for the number of police (but not
homicide arrest rate), and population.  They conclude that social disorder, captured by motor vehicle
fatalities, causes homicide.  Kelling and Sousa (2001) examine the effect of misdemeanor arrests on police
precincts for two years in New York City.  They conclude that "broken windows" policing works, but in
this study both felony arrests and the size of the police are omitted from the analysis, and number of
misdemeanor arrests is the only criminal justice-related variable.7
felony crimes by providing a signal regarding enhanced commitment and effectiveness of
the police force in reducing all types of crime.  Alternatively, increased misdemeanor
arrests may reduce felony crimes by incapacitating individuals who would have
committed those crimes in the absence of the misdemeanor arrests.  We document later in
the paper that incapacitation is not a plausible explanation  for a negative relationship
between misdemeanor arrests and felony crimes.
III.  Empirical Model
We estimate crime equations of the following form.
(1)      CRit=λi+ ΣαijCRi,t-j + ΣβiqURt-q + ΣγirRMINWt-r + ΣδikARRi,t-k +ΣπinPRISt-n
+ΣφipPOLt-p  +  ΣηimMISARRt-m+ Σµt-sΤEENSt-s + ΣϕiwSEASw + εit,
where CRi,t stands for ith crime in month t (i=1: Murder, i=2: Burglary, etc.). The
two variables that capture economic conditions in New York City are the New York City
unemployment rate (UR), and the real minimum wage (RMINW).  The arrest rate (arrests
per crime) is a standard measure of deterrence.  However, it is well-known that the use of
the arrest rate as an explanatory variable creates biased estimates.  This is because crime,
which is the dependent variable, appears in the denominator of the arrest rate as an
explanatory variable.  Potential solutions are to deflate the arrests by population, or to
substantially lag the arrest rate (Levitt 1998a; Mustard, forthcoming).  In our case, none
of these strategies is feasible because population figures are not available, and it is
unclear exactly how many lags to impose with high frequency data we employ.
9
                                                                                                                                                                            
9  In models that use panel data with annual frequency the arrest rate is typically lagged one year (Mustard
forthcoming, Mocan and Gittings 2002, Levitt 1998a).8
Therefore, following Corman and Mocan (2000), we use arrests (ARR) as an explanatory
variable, but convert the estimated arrest elasticity of crime to the arrest rate elasticity of
crime, as explained in the results section.
PRIS stands for the number of New York City residents incarcerated in state
correctional facilities.  POL is the size of the New York City police force. Adding police
to the model in addition to felony and misdemeanor arrests allows us to investigate
whether police presence has an additional impact on crime, after controlling for their
actions.   MISARR stands for the number of misdemeanor arrests.  This variable allows
for the test of validity of the broken windows hypothesis; that is, if broken windows
hypothesis has merit, then after controlling for economic conditions and deterrence
measures (including crime-specific arrests), an increase in misdemeanor arrests  should
have a negative impact on crime.   
To control for the impact of changing demographics on crime we include the
number of 14-to-17 year olds in New York City (TEENS).   SEAS represents a vector of
11 monthly dichotomous variables to control for the impact of seasonality on crime.
The use of monthly data allows us to address the simultaneity between crime and
deterrence.  Following Corman and Mocan (2000), in Equation (1) j≥1, k≥1, n≥1, m≥1.
Put differently, it is postulated that the number of crimes committed in month t depends
on the past dynamics of the same criminal activity, the past values of arrests for that
crime, and the past values of the misdemeanor arrests and incarcerations.   These
variables are lagged one month to avoid reverse causality from crime.  On the other hand,
q≥0, r≥0, p≥0, s≥0; that is the contemporaneous values of the unemployment rate, the
minimum wage, teens, and police are included.  This means that, variations in crime9
cannot impact the current values of these variables.  This is obvious for monthly data
regarding economic and demographic variables; and it also applies to police because as
explained in Corman and Mocan (2000), it takes at least six months to increase the size of
the police force.  Thus, an increase in crime in a given month cannot generate an increase
in the police force in the same month.
10
IV.  Data
The data are compiled from a number of different sources.  Crime and arrest data
were obtained from the Crime Analysis Unit of the New York City Police Department.
Monthly crime data are available between 1970 and 1999.  The five FBI index crimes
(murder, assault, robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft) in New York City during this
time period are displayed in Figures 1-5.
11  Crimes are measured as  reported complaints.
Murders, motor vehicle thefts, and assaults reached their maximum in either 1989 or
1990, and all crimes declined substantially since 1990, reaching their minimum in 1999.
Later in the paper we investigate the extent to which our models explain the decline in
crime between 1990 and 1999.  Arrests for these crimes are displayed in Figures 6-10.
They remain stable or decline between 1990 and 1999, which is not surprising because
                                                          
10 If an increase in arrests in a given month influences crimes in that same month through the incapacitation
effect, lagging arrests by one month would be a specification error.  However, Levitt (1998b) and Corman
and Mocan (2000) demonstrated that the incapacitation effect is insignificant.
11 We excluded rapes and grand larceny.  The former crime was excluded because there is good reason to
believe that reporting rates for these crimes varied significantly over the thirty-year period.  Grand larceny
was excluded because both the nominal and real value of the crime changed over the thirty-year period.
The five crimes included in this analysis are believed to more consistent in their nature and reporting over
the thirty year period.10
crimes declined during the same period. Arrest rates (arrests per crime) increase over the
same time period. 
12
 We include misdemeanor arrests in the analysis to capture the changing nature of
policing policies during the 1990's, related to the "broken windows" hypothesis.
Misdemeanor arrests pertain to arrests made for crimes such as petit larceny, assault in
the third degree, prostitution, criminal mischief, and theft of services. Figure 11 shows
that misdemeanor arrests fell in the early 1970's, rose somewhat in the early 1980's, and
then experienced a large, sustained increase around 1994.
It is difficult to find a single, consistent measure of the overall economic health of
New York City and its residents.  We use the unemployment rate and the real minimum
wage as measures of economic conditions in New York City. Each of these indicators
measures a different aspect of the economy; therefore each has a different pattern over
the three decades.
13  Figure 12 presents the real minimum wage in New York City,
computed as the New York State or Federal (whichever was higher) minimum wage, and
adjusted for inflation, using the New York City Consumer Price Index (base year=1982-
84).
14 After a sustained erosion in the value of the minimum wage in 1980s, there were
two nominal wage increases in 1990 and 1991; and two other increases were
implemented in 1996 and 1997. Overall, the real minimum wage remained rather stable
during the 1990s.   Figure 13 displays the City's unemployment rate, which reached
double-digit levels for sustained periods during both the mid-1970's and the early 1990's.
                                                          
12 The arrest rates are displayed in Appendix Figures A1- A5.
13 In the sensitivity analysis section we report results from the models where total recipients of public
assistance is employed instead of the unemployment rate.
14 Minimum wage data was obtained from the State of New York Department of Labor, Division of
Research and Statistics, and Consumer Price Index data was obtained from the US Department of Labor's
Bureau of Labor Statistics.11
According to the unemployment rate, economic conditions were worse toward the early-
to mid-1990's and improved in the latter half of that decade.
15
Figure 14 presents the number of uniformed officers at all ranks.  In April of
1995, the Transit Police were merged with the NYPD, and in May, the Housing Police
were added.  In order to account for this merger, and to have a consistent series, we
subtracted the Transit and Housing police from the total number of officers after April
1995.
16  The size of the police force varied considerably over the three decades under
consideration.  In 1970, there were around 32,000 uniformed officers in the New York
Police Department.  In conjunction with New York City's 1970's fiscal crisis, the number
of officers fell dramatically between 1970 and 1980, attaining a annual low point in 1980
--a drop of almost 30%.  Since 1980, the overall trend has been one of growth in the
number of officers, ending in 1999 with almost 35,000.  This represents a quite modest
change from the original level in 1970, but it is a dramatic (more than 50%) increase
from its lowest level in 1980.
Data sources allow an annual count of prison inmates from New York City who
are in State Correctional Facilities from December of 1974 through December of 1988.
We interpolated the monthly figures from the annual ones up to January 1988, when
prison population data began to be recorded monthly.  As Figure 15 demonstrates, the
prison population from New York City grew through most of the sample period, then
leveled off during the last half of the 1990's.
17
                                                          
15 These data were obtained from the US Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics.
16 We have subtracted, rather than added because we were not able to obtain separate Transit and Housing
Police numbers, beginning in January of 1970.  Police data were obtained from the Office of Management
and Planning at the New York City Police Department.
17 Prison population data were obtained from the Independent Budget Office of New York City.12
Consideration of the population’s demographic composition is important;
however, most demographic data rely on the decennial censuses, with yearly values
interpolated in-between.   Rather than using Census-based data, we proxy the number of
teens by summing the number of students entering ninth grade in the current year plus in
the previous three years in both public and private schools in New York City.
18 Because
we only have September counts for each year, we used the Hodrick-Prescott filter to
obtain the trend of the data (Figure 16), which is employed in empirical analysis.
19
V. Empirical Implementation and the Results
  Following Corman and Mocan (2000), Mocan (1999) and the literature they cite,
we applied unit root tests to investigate the trend behavior of the variables using standard
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.  The results, displayed in Appendix Table A-1, provide
evidence for unit roots (stochastic trends) in all variables except for the prison population
and teen population.  This means that the proper specification of Equation (1) should
involve regressing the first difference of crime variables on the first difference of the
right-hand variables with unit roots and should not include a time trend as a regressor.
20
Co-integration tests, which are also displayed in Appendix Table A-1 suggest that there is
                                                          
18 If arrests are a good proxy for crime commission, then this group commits more crimes per capita than
18 to 20 year olds or those 21 and over.  Data were obtained from the Independent Budget Office of New
York City.
19  We used the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to obtain the slowly evolving trend
component. In this procedure, the trend component in the variable under investigation, , is obtained by














2 2 ΣΓΣ ΓΓ () ( ) λ where X is the variable of interest, and  is the
weight on squared second difference of growth component, which penalizes acceleration in the trend.
Following previous examples (e.g., Blackburn and Ravn, 1992; Mocan, 1999),  is set to be 1,600, but the
decomposition was not sensitive to the variations in the value of .13
evidence of co-integration between crime, and the right-hand variables in all cases,
indicating that the estimated regressions should include an error correction term.  This
means that even though crime and its determinants are governed by random trends, there
exists an equilibrium relationship between them, which keeps them together in the long-
run.
The lag length of each variable is determined by Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).  The natural logarithms of the variables are taken before differencing, and
estimations are carried out using a heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust
covariance matrix with serial correlation up to lag twenty-four.
Table 1 displays a summary of the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the
five different crimes.  It reports summed coefficients along with standard errors.
21 The
sum of the coefficients represents the long-run impact of the explanatory variables on
crime. The numbers in parentheses after variables represent the range of the lag length.
For example, ARRESTS (1-5) in the murder regression indicates that murders are
influenced by five past values of murder arrests as determined by AIC.  The sensitivity of
the results to alternative lag lengths is discussed below.  Because the prison population
variable was measured beginning in December of 1974, regressions span from December
of 1974 through December of 1999.  The full results appear in Appendix Tables A-2
through A-6.
As Table 1 demonstrates, felony arrests have a negative and statistically
significant impact on all five index crimes analyzed.   An increase in prison inmates from
                                                                                                                                                                            
20 The teen population variable and the prison variable do not contain unit roots, and therefore these
variables enter the models in levels rather than first differences.
21  Because the summed coefficients of teen population were never significant, they are not reported  in
Table 1.14
New York has a negative impact on all crimes but assault.  Controlling for other
measures of deterrence, the size of the police force has an impact on motor vehicle thefts
only.
Misdemeanor arrests have a significant negative impact on robbery and motor
vehicle theft.  This indicates that, holding constant their own arrests, the size of the police
force and prison population, the growth rates in robberies and motor vehicle thefts
decline as the growth rate of misdemeanor arrests increases.  This result provides support
for the broken windows hypothesis in case of these two crimes.
It can be argued that the impact of misdemeanor arrests on robbery and motor
vehicle theft is observed because of an incapacitation effect.  However, there is evidence
that, for most misdemeanor arrests, incarcerations occur in a small minority of cases and
tend to be short-term.  Nelson (1991) studied misdemeanor arrests for individuals in New
York State occurring between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1986.
22 During this
period, the total number of misdemeanor arrests for the largest 4 counties in New York
City (excluding Richmond) was 122, 797.  Of these arrests, 9.4% resulted in a conviction
with a jail sentence.  For those sentenced to a jail term, the average length of stay was
27.5 days.  Thus, the expected jail sentence given misdemeanor arrest was 2.6 days.
23
                                                          
22 Nelson (1991) examined the first arrest during the period for any individual, and only lower court
processing, since almost all persons arrested for misdemeanor charges were disposed in the lower courts.
The study excluded prostitution and DWI arrests. There is specific information for four out of five New
York City counties: NY, Kings (Brooklyn), Queens, and Bronx.  Richmond (Staten Island) is not reported
as a separate county, and is, therefore, excluded from these results.
23 Note that this number will be considerably lower than the expected incarceration for those convicted of a
misdemeanor or the expected incarceration for those in jail. This is because many individuals arrested for
more serious (felony) crimes are convicted of lesser offenses and/or are sentenced to jail terms (rather than
prison).   In a study of felony case processing in New York between 1990 and 1992, Nelson (1995) found
that  individuals convicted of a felony were more likely to be sent to jail than sent to prison, and about 40%
of those who were arrested for a felony and were convicted, had been convicted (most likely plea-
bargained) of a misdemeanor offense.15
Some defendants who were convicted of a misdemeanor offense received a
sentence of “time served”.  This means that they spent some time in jail prior to their
conviction.  Approximately 13% of those arrested for a misdemeanor received sentences
of “time served”.  The average time between arrest and arraignment for December of that
year was slightly over 24 hours, down from the 40 hours in 1989 (Cooper 1996).  This
information indicates that misdemeanor arrests would result in negligible incarceration
effects for most offenders.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the impact of misdemeanor
arrests on robbery and motor vehicle theft is due to incapacitation.
Increases in the real minimum wage are found to significantly reduce robberies
and murders, and higher unemployment is significantly related to more burglaries and
motor vehicle thefts. Thus, although it is not always the same economic indicator, there is
evidence that economic conditions impact all felony crimes except assaults.
24
 Magnitudes
To assess the magnitudes of the effects of each variable on crime, we used the
sum of the coefficients reported in Table 1, and calculated the elasticities of own arrest
rates, misdemeanor arrests, prison population, the unemployment rate, and the real
minimum wage.  The calculated elasticities are reported in Table 2.   Note that we have
converted the results from number of felony arrests to the arrest rate, to allow our results
to be compared with similar elasticity estimates.
25
                                                          
24 Although the estimated models include a large number of deterrence variables, there are other potentially
important variables such as the conviction rates which are not included.  Mustard (forthcoming) shows that
conviction rates are negatively correlated with arrest rates, which suggests that the true  impact of the arrest
rates may be larger than those reported here.
25 We calculate the elasticity of crime with respect to the arrest rate as follows:   ARRT=AR/CR, where
ARRT is the arrest rate, AR represents the number of arrests, and CR stands for crime.  That means that16
Table 2 includes elasticities only for statistically significant variables. The first
row in each cell reports the elasticity calculated using a zero-growth steady-state scenario
for the variables in the system.  The elasticities reported in the second row are calculated
using the average of the year-to-year growth rates of the explanatory variables.  Table 2
demonstrates, for example, that a 10 percent increase in the murder arrest rate generates
about a four percent reduction in murders, and a 10 percent increase in the real minimum
wage results in a 6.3 to 6.9 percent decrease in murders.
Robberies and motor vehicle thefts are more responsive to changes in their arrest
rates than are murder, burglary, and assault.   Also, robberies and motor vehicle thefts are
impacted by misdemeanor arrests.  A 10 percent increase in misdemeanor arrests
generates 1.6 to 2.1 percent decline in motor vehicle thefts and 2.5 to 3.2 percent decline
in robberies.
The average unemployment rate between 1974 and 1999 was 8 percent in New
York City.  Using the unemployment rate elasticities reported in Table 2, this means that
a one-percentage point decline in the unemployment rate  (a 12.5% decline) generates
about a 2.2 percent decline in burglaries and 1.8 percent decline in motor-vehicle thefts.
These magnitudes are remarkably similar to those reported by Gould, Mustard and
Weinberg (2002), and Freeman and Rodgers (2000).
The mean values for arrest rates are 65.6% for murder, 56% for assault, 9.5% for
burglary, 24.2% for robbery and 8.6 % for motor vehicle theft.   Thus, a one percentage
point increase in their respective arrest rates would generate the following declines: 0.6%
                                                                                                                                                                            
ln(ARRT)=ln(AR)-ln(CR), and ln(ARRT)/ ln(CR)= ln(AR)/ ln(CR)- 1.  Let E denote the elasticity of
crime with respect to its own arrest rate, and let K represent the elasticity of crime with respect to
arrests.  Then, E=K/(1-K).17
decline in murder, 0.4% decline in assault, 3.1% decline in burglary, 2.4% decline in
robbery, and 5.9% decline in motor vehicle theft.
Although prison population is statistically significantly related to four of the
crimes, the magnitudes of the elasticities are low, ranging from –0.03 to –0.08.  Marvel
and Moody (1994) reported similarly low incapacitation elasticities for violent crimes,
where their elasticity for all index crimes was –0.16.  Levitt (1996) estimated larger
incapacitation elasticities, although Donohue and Siegelman (1998) argue that these
elasticities may be too high. Using the same algorithm employed by Marvell and Moody
(1994) to adjust for reporting rate,
26 we find that a 10 percent increase in NYC residents
who are in state prisons generates 962 fewer burglaries, 365 fewer robberies, 11 fewer
murders, and 336 fewer motor vehicle thefts per year.
Sensitivity Analysis
To investigate the robustness of the results we performed a number of exercises.  First,
we subtracted drug related misdemeanor arrests from total misdemeanor arrests, and
obtained total non-drug misdemeanor arrests.  The time-series behavior of this measure is
is shown in Appendix Figure A-6.  Using this measure of misdemeanor arrests, we
obtained very similar results.   Second, we replaced the unemployment rate with total
recipients of public assistance in New York City.
27 The results remain unchanged, and an
increase in total recipients was positively related to robberies and motor vehicle thefts.
Finally, we experimented with alternative lag lengths.  The lag lengths of the models
                                                          
26 Following Marvell and Moody (1994) we used the crime-specific reporting rates from 2000 Crime
Victimization Survey to adjust the number of crimes averted.
27 These numbers were obtained from the Office of Data Analysis and Research of the New York City
Human Resources Administration.  Public Assistance Recipients include those receiving Family Assistance
Program  (FAP, formerly under the AFDC program) and those receiving Safety Net Assistance (SNA,
formerly under the Home Relief program).  Note that the welfare programs were changed by the New York
State Welfare Reform Act of 1997.18
presented in Table 1 were determined by Akaike Information Criterion, which indicated
different lag lengths for explanatory variables.  In this exercise we imposed the same lag
length to each variable, and tried lag lengths of 3, 6, 9 and 12.  The results, shown in the
Appendix Table A-7, are reasonably consistent with those obtained from the earlier ones,
although there is some sensitivity pertaining to misdemeanor arrest.  For example,
misdemeanor arrests have a negative and significant effect in some lag length
specifications  for murder and burglary, and it is positive in assault, whereas it was not
significant in the original models  for these crimes.
 What accounted for the large drops in felony crimes in New York City in the
1990's?   
To put these results into perspective, we examined the impact of  each of our
variables in reducing felony crime in New York City in the 1990s.  Using the elasticity
estimates reported in Table 2 and the actual percentage changes in the deterrence and
economic variables between 1990 and 1999, we calculated the percent change in the
number of crimes between 1990 and 1999 attributable to each variable.  The results are
presented in Table 3.  Felony arrest rates (except for motor vehicle thefts) increased
dramatically during the 1990s, with a range of about 50% to 70%.  Similarly,
misdemeanor arrests increased over 70%.
28  The size of the police force increased about
35% during the same period, and the number of imprisoned New York City residents also
experienced a substantial increase during this period as well (24%).   Economic variables
did not experience the same magnitude of change as the criminal justice variables.  The
                                                          
28 The increase is measured as the percentage change between the 12-month average in 1990 and the 12-
month average in 1999.19
unemployment rate declined three percent and real minimum wage rose 12 percent
between 1990 and 1999.
As depicted in Table 3, the model is able to explain a sizable fraction of the actual
drop in the number of felony crimes in New York City during the 1990's.    For example,
the actual drop in murders between 1990 and 1999 is 73 percent.  Our model suggests
that the observed increase in the murder arrest rate accounts for 29 percent of this decline.
Increased prison population accounts for 2 percent of the decline in murders, and the
increase in the real minimum wage explains 8 percent of this drop.  Thus, these three
factors together predict a 39 percent decline in murders between 1990 and 1999.  The
actual decline is 73 percent; thus we are able to explain 53 percent of the drop in murders
between 1990 and 1999 (39 percent of the observed 73 percent decline).  Similarly,
arrests, police, prison population, and economic variables account for the 86 percent of
the actual drop in robberies, and between a third and a half of the drop in burglaries and
motor vehicle thefts.  As Table 3 demonstrates, the primary reason for the drop in felony
crimes in the decade of the 1990's is due to felony arrests, and misdemeanor arrests.
Although prison population and economic variables were found to be significant, their
impact is not as large.  Increased police presence accounts for 20 percent of the decline in
motor vehicle thefts, but has no direct influence on other crimes.
The reason for the weak impact on economic variables is that their elasticities are
relatively smaller and the actual change in the unemployment and minimum wage in
1990s was not big enough to generate a large impact on crime.
29  For example, the
minimum wage increased from an average of 2.77 in 1990 to 3.09 in 1999, which is a 1220
percent increase.  The mean value of real minimum wage was $3.86 in the first half of the
1970s.  Had the real minimum wage been increased to that level from1990 to 1999, its
impact on the decline in robberies would have been 14 percent, and its impact on the
decline in murders would have been 26 percent.
30
VI. Summary
While the U.S. crime rates declined in the last decade, the reverse is true for most
European Union countries (Barclay, Tavares and Siddique 2001, Pfeiffer 1998, Vinocur
2002).  In both cases, scholars and policy makers try to understand the relative
importance of economics factors and deterrence measures on criminal activity.   For
example, it has been debated whether the remarkable decline in criminal activity in New
York City between 1990 and 1999 is attributable to “get tough” policies or to improved
economic conditions.
31   Similarly, the relative impacts of police, prisons, and [social]
disadvantage on crime have been questioned by Britain’s Home Office Minister Paul
Boateng (CNN World 2001), and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin Jospin has
reassessed the relative importance of social conditions, alone, in combatting crime, where
                                                                                                                                                                            
29 Most accounts of drug usage in New York City indicate that the rise of cocaine-related drug use in the
early 1990s was more dramatic than the subsequent decline later in the decade, so that cocaine drug usage
increased from 1990 to 1999.  Thus, a dramatic drop in drug usage could not account for the drop in crime.
30 Also, if we were to select 1994 to 1999 as the comparison years for unemployment, the unemployment
rate in New York City fell by 30%, and the drop in unemployment would have accounted for 5 to 6 percent
of the drop in burglaries and motor vehicle thefts.
31 Another potential explanation is legalized abortion.  Donohue and Levitt (2001) show that legalized
abortion had an impact on crime rates with a twenty-year lag.  They find that crime was 15-25 percent
lower in 1997 in comparison to what would have been observed had abortion remained illegal.  New York
City liberalized its abortion law in July 1970.  Joyce and Mocan (1990) show that legalization of abortion
had a significant impact on adolescent childbearing in New York City.  Thus, it is likely that some of the
residual drop in observed crime in New York City (one which is not explained by our model) is attributable
to legalized abortion.21
he stated that he was naïve to believe that his battle against unemployment would reduce
crime (Nichols 2002).
In this paper we investigate the impacts of economic conditions (carrots) and
sanctions (sticks) on murder, assault, robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft in New
York City.  Carrots are measured by the unemployment rate and the real minimum wage.
Sticks are measured by crime-specific arrests, size of the police force and the number of
New York City residents in state prisons.  In addition, we test the validity of the “broken
windows” hypothesis, which asserts that by implementing policing strategies which
signal that minor levels of criminal activity will not be ignored, criminals will be deterred
from committing more serious crimes.  The paper uses monthly time-series data from
New York City spanning 1974-1999, and consistent with the statements of the Police
Department and major Rudolph Guiliani, uses misdemeanor arrests as a measure of
"broken windows" policing.
We find that own felony arrests deter all five crimes analyzed. The unemployment
rate has an impact on burglary and motor vehicle theft, while real minimum wage has an
impact on murder and robbery.  An increase in the number of New York City residents in
state correctional facilities reduces all crimes but assault, but the magnitude of the
influence is not large.
Controlling for economic conditions and deterrence (real minimum wage,
unemployment rate, felony arrests, prison population and the size of the police force),
misdemeanor arrests have an impact on motor vehicle theft and robbery.  A 10 percent
increase in misdemeanor arrests decreases motor vehicle thefts by 1.6 to 2.1 percent and
robberies by 2.5 to 3.2 percent.  We do not find evidence to support the contention that22
broken windows policing strategy affects the other crimes.
Between 1990 and 1999 New York City experienced a 73 percent drop in
homicide, a 66 percent drop in burglary, a 40 percent drop in assault.  Robbery and motor
vehicle theft declined by 67 percent and 73 percent, respectively, during the same period.
Our models explain from about 33 to 86 percent of the observed decline in these crimes.
While both economic and deterrence variables are important in explaining the decline in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sum of the Coefficients
Coefficient Std. Error
Murder
ARRESTS (1-5)     -0.67*** (0.229)
POLICE (0-2) -0.468 (1.214)
TOTAL MISD. ARRESTS (1-5) -0.629 (0.395)
PRISON POPULATION (1-8)    -0.077** (0.036)
UNEMPLOYMENT (0-3) 0.273 (0.329)
NYC MINIMUM WAGE (0) -0.692** (0.297)
Burglary
ARRESTS (1-21) -0.466** (0.212)
POLICE (0-1) -0.235 (0.259)
TOTAL MISD. ARRESTS (1-2) -0.058 (0.06)
PRISON POPULATION (1-18) -0.057*** (0.01)
UNEMPLOYMENT (0-2) 0.164* (0.088)
NYC MINIMUM WAGE (0-2) 0.328 (0.325)
Assault
ARRESTS (1-4) -0.247* (0.145)
POLICE (0-1) -0.028 (0.247)
TOTAL MISD. ARRESTS (1-2) 0.075 (0.086)
PRISON POPULATION (1-5) -0.007 (0.015)
UNEMPLOYMENT (0-1) 0.078 (0.124)
NYC MINIMUM WAGE (0-1) 0.182 (0.202)
Robbery
ARRESTS (1-12) -1.31*** (0.344)
POLICE (0-2) -0.364 (0.454)
TOTAL MISD. ARRESTS (1-2) -0.25*** (0.049)
PRISON POPULATION (1-11) -0.028* (0.015)
UNEMPLOYMENT (0-2) -0.148 (0.099)
NYC MINIMUM WAGE (0-1) -0.373* (0.21)
Motor Vehicle Theft
ARRESTS (1-14) -1.042*** (0.272)
POLICE (0-2) -0.563** (0.28)
TOTAL MISD. ARRESTS (1-2) -0.156** (0.068)
PRISON POPULATION (1-8) -0.027*** (0.01)
UNEMPLOYMENT (0) 0.125** (0.049)
NYC MINIMUM WAGE (0-2) -0.254 (0.323)



































Prison -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
Note:  Elasticity estimates are calculated only for significant variables.  The top estimate uses a
zero-growth steady-state scenario, and the bottom estimate is calculated using the average of the
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      Appendix Table A-1
Tests for Unit Root and Co-Integration














Real Minimum Wage -1.87
Misdemeanor Arrests -2.85
Police -1.47
Unit root  tests are based on the regression Xt=+t+Xt-1+iXt-i+t.   An
asterisk indicates that the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.  The co-integration
test involves running Yt=+Yt-1+t, where Y stands for the residuals of the co-
integrating regression.  All variables are de-seasonalized.41
Appendix Table A-2
Full Results
The Determinants of Murder
Variable Coefficient Std Error
Murder{1} -0.53874*** (0.095)
Murder {2} -0.4612*** (0.111)
Murder {3} -0.3639*** (0.093)
Murder {4} -0.3022*** (0.079)
Murder {5} -0.2532*** (0.092)
Murder {6} -0.1884** (0.077)
Murder {7} -0.0529 (0.054)
Murder Arrests {1} -0.212*** (0.068)
Murder Arrests {2} -0.1692** (0.081)
Murder Arrests {3} -0.1382** (0.069)
Murder Arrests {4} -0.059 (0.073)
Murder Arrests {5} -0.0902 (0.067)
Police 0.1182 (0.543)
Police {1} -0.1185 (0.423)
Police {2} -0.4708 (0.463)
Misdemeanor  Arrests {1} -0.1051 (0.080)
Misdemeanor  Arrests {2} -0.1754 (0.136)
Misdemeanor  Arrests {3} -0.0489 (0.125)
Misdemeanor  Arrests {4} -0.1336 (0.094)
Misdemeanor  Arrests {5} -0.1624* (0.096)
NYC Unemployment rate 0.3245 (0.215)
NYC Unemployment rate {1} 0.2032 (0.124)
NYC Unemployment rate {2} -0.2542*** (0.097)
NYC Minimum wage -0.6936*** (0.229)
Prison population {1} -0.457 (1.638)
Prison population {2} 5.8711** (2.945)
Prison population {3} -7.6085*** (2.395)
Prison population {4} 1.8282 (2.136)
Prison population {5} -2.4489 (2.469)
Prison population {6} 1.1419 (3.012)
Prison population {7} 3.7759 (3.658)
Prison population {8} -2.1791 (1.926)
Teen population 6.4249 (9.139)
Teen population{1} -16.7925 (28.816)
Teen population{2} 13.5529 (27.259)
Teen population{4} -10.8512 (24.404)
Teen population{6} 24.1899 (33.151)
Teen population{8} -32.392 (30.551)
Teen population{10} 21.7136 (15.872)42
(Table A-2 concluded)












Error correction term{1} -0.2866*** (0.085)
Constant 12.9855*** (3.933)
Note:  *, **, or *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.43
Appendix Table A-3
Full Results
The Determinants of Burglary
Variable Coefficient Std Error
Burglary {1} -0.3536*** (0.058)
Burglary {2} -0.188*** (0.060)
Burglary {3} -0.0292 (0.072)
Burglary {4} -0.1392** (0.066)
Burglary {5} -0.0068 (0.053)
Burglary {6} -0.0117 (0.073)
Burglary {7} -0.1446* (0.085)
Burglary {8} -0.0835 (0.078)
Burglary {9} 0.0163 (0.052)
Burglary Arrests{1} -0.0742** (0.036)
Burglary Arrests {2} -0.0712* (0.039)
Burglary Arrests {3} -0.0592* (0.035)
Burglary Arrests {4} -0.0041 (0.040)
Burglary Arrests {5} -0.0695** (0.033)
Burglary Arrests {6} -0.1267*** (0.048)
Burglary Arrests {7} -0.0508* (0.029)
Burglary Arrests {8} -0.0927** (0.038)
Burglary Arrests {9} -0.0055 (0.040)
Burglary Arrests {10} -0.0347 (0.034)
Burglary Arrests {11} 0.0002 (0.037)
Burglary Arrests {12} 0.038 (0.037)
Burglary Arrests {13} 0.0963** (0.048)
Burglary Arrests {14} 0.054 (0.038)
Burglary Arrests {15} 0.0235 (0.033)
Burglary Arrests {16} 0.0024 (0.037)
Burglary Arrests {17} 0.0421 (0.038)
Burglary Arrests {18} 0.0374 (0.045)
Burglary Arrests {19} -0.0834*** (0.030)
Burglary Arrests {20} -0.0607 (0.038)
Burglary Arrests {21} -0.0332 (0.029)
Police -0.1785 (0.253)
Police {1} -0.102 (0.191)
Misdemeanor Arrests {1} -0.0325 (0.040)
Misdemeanor Arrests {2} -0.021 (0.034)
NYC Unemployment rate 0.0317 (0.047)
NYC Unemployment rate{1} 0.1024** (0.046)
NYC Unemployment rate {2} 0.0279 (0.049)
NYC Minimum wage 0.025 (0.113)
NYC Minimum wage{1} -0.0741 (0.208)
NYC Minimum wage{2} 0.3765*** (0.134)
Prison population{1} -1.3678*** (0.451)44
(Table A-3 concluded)
Prison population{2} 0.4452 (0.868)
Prison population{3} 0.1779 (1.085)
Prison population{4} 1.7763* (1.042)
Prison population{5} -1.8081** (0.869)
Prison population{6} 0.4044 (0.967)
Prison population{7} 0.526 (0.967)
Prison population{8} -1.157 (0.917)
Prison population{9} 0.478 (0.926)
Prison population{10} 1.1226 (1.137)
Prison population{11} -1.1907 (0.917)
Prison population{12} -0.4413 (1.082)
Prison population{13} 1.0001 (1.019)
Prison population{14} -0.9498 (0.992)
Prison population{15} 0.8878 (0.902)
Prison population{16} 1.329 (1.085)
Prison population{17} -3.2148*** (1.000)
Prison population{18} 1.9243** (0.785)
Teen population 208.5542*** (0.000)
Teen population{1} -686.5794*** (0.000)
Teen population{2} 690.5012*** (0.000)
Teen population{4} -327.04*** (0.000)
Teen population{6} 157.8234*** (0.000)
Teen population{8} -50.8854 (73.524)
Teen population{10} 8.79 (47.769)












Error correction term{1} -0.0973*** (0.030)
Constant 6.5654*** (0.959)
Note:  *, **, or *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.45
Appendix Table A-4
Full Results
The Determinants of Assault










Assault Arrests{1} -0.0678 (0.058)
Assault Arrests{2} -0.0681 (0.062)
Assault Arrests{3} -0.1001* (0.056)
Assault Arrests{4} -0.0123 (0.050)
Police -0.1728 (0.200)
Police{1} 0.1419 (0.179)
Misdemeanor Arrests{1} 0.0467 (0.043)
Misdemeanor Arrests{2} 0.0287 (0.051)
NYC Unemployment rate 0.1363* (0.081)
NYC Unemployment rate{1} -0.0581 (0.074)
NYC Minimum wage -0.0359 (0.143)
NYC Minimum wage{1} 0.2168 (0.154)
Prison population{1} 0.2181 (0.633)
Prison population{2} -1.1809 (1.175)
Prison population{3} 1.7936 (1.638)
Prison population{4} 0.0683 (1.753)
Prison population{5} -0.9064 (0.808)
Teen population 468.367 (883.768)
Teen population{1} -2606.8104 (2940.081)
Teen population{2} 3919.5578 (3009.194)
Teen population{4} -3534.6163** (1698.657)
Teen population{6} 3035.0497** (1410.602)
Teen population{8} -1900.7907 (1161.810)
Teen population{10} 762.6579 (634.172)













Error correction term{1} -0.1214* (0.069)
Constant 2.7949* (1.532)
Note:  *, **, or *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.47
Appendix Table A-5
Full Results
The Determinants of Robbery






Robbery Arrests{1} -0.1077** (0.048)
Robbery Arrests{2} -0.1022 (0.073)
Robbery Arrests{3} -0.1363** (0.059)
Robbery Arrests{4} -0.1255*** (0.041)
Robbery Arrests{5} -0.1514*** (0.045)
Robbery Arrests{6} -0.1909*** (0.041)
Robbery Arrests{7} -0.0664* (0.035)
Robbery Arrests{8} -0.0507 (0.040)
Robbery Arrests{9} -0.0832** (0.042)
Robbery Arrests{10} -0.1224*** (0.039)
Robbery Arrests{11} -0.1458*** (0.039)




Misdemeanor Arrests{1} -0.1293*** (0.033)
Misdemeanor Arrests{2} -0.1178*** (0.031)
NYC Unemployment rate -0.0564 (0.046)
NYC Unemployment rate{1} -0.0858*** (0.032)
NYC Unemployment rate{2} -0.0083 (0.056)
NYC Minimum wage -0.2707** (0.137)
NYC Minimum wage{1} -0.1033 (0.130)
Prison population{1} -0.7517 (0.517)
Prison population{2} -0.4815 (0.777)
Prison population{3} 1.4209 (1.126)
Prison population{4} 0.809 (1.535)
Prison population{5} -1.7438 (1.204)
Prison population{6} 0.5876 (0.642)
Prison population{7} -0.0029 (0.652)
Prison population{8} -0.6471 (0.744)
Prison population{9} 0.4798 (1.108)
Prison population{10} 0.0146 (1.437)
Prison population{11} 0.2862 (0.761)
Teen population 2817.0828*** (841.814)
Teen population{1} -9632.7263*** (3201.098)
Teen population{2} 9956.7429*** (3787.168)48
(Table A-5 concluded)
Teen population{4} -4719.9389* (2632.832)
Teen population{6} 2090.1509 (1962.186)
Teen population{8} -584.9609 (1139.855)
Teen population{10} 70.114 (448.770)












Error correction term{1} -0.0879** (0.035)
Constant 4.1022*** (0.924)
Note:  *, **, or *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.49
Appendix Table A-6
Full Results
The Determinants of Motor Vehicle Theft
Variable Coefficient Std Error
Motor Vehicle Theft{1} -0.4097*** (0.076)
Motor Vehicle Theft{2} -0.0755** (0.038)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{1} -0.0588 (0.042)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{2} -0.1759*** (0.049)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{3} -0.1339*** (0.033)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{4} -0.0972*** (0.037)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{5} -0.1183*** (0.031)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{6} -0.1214*** (0.039)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{7} -0.0842** (0.034)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{8} -0.0824** (0.034)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{9} -0.0309 (0.037)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{10} -0.0228 (0.036)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{11} -0.0414 (0.037)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{12} -0.0802* (0.043)
Motor Vehicle Theft Arrests{13} 0.0061 (0.033)




Misdemeanor Arrests{1} -0.135*** (0.039)
Misdemeanor Arrests {2} -0.0218 (0.043)
NYC Unemployment rate 0.1239*** (0.045)
NYC Minimum wage -0.2712 (0.189)
NYC Minimum wage {1} -0.2605 (0.202)
NYC Minimum wage {2} 0.2651*** (0.084)
Prison population{1} -0.3992 (0.421)
Prison population {2} 0.7225 (0.73)
Prison population {3} -1.1617 (0.918)
Prison population {4} 1.0593 (0.915)
Prison population {5} -0.1946 (1.128)
Prison population {6} 0.1103 (1.293)
Prison population {7} 0.2825 (0.975)
Prison population {8} -0.4467 (0.609)
Teen population 19.0877*** (6.587)
Teen population{1} -56.7799*** (20.443)
Teen population{2} 48.1148** (19.214)
Teen population{4} -6.5747 (9.507)
Teen population{6} -15.7994** (8.013)
Teen population{8} 21.7212*** (6.468)
Teen population{10} -12.5658*** (3.422)













Error correction term{1} -0.1469*** (0.031)
Constant 5.0534*** (1.118)


































































































































































































Note:  *, **, or *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.